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1 :'\ 'Ill/ SU!'RD!F COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-------- o Oo-------
IWt;.\LJJ c;. Ml TC!!LLL and 
K;\THLLE:-I H. ~II1THELL, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
DOYAL E\'AN STE\V.\RT 
KAREN LEE STEWART, 
and STEWART ~ CO., 
Utah corporation, 
and 
his wife; 
INC., a 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendants and Respondents.) 
STATEMENT OF TilE Kl"!D UF CASE 
Brief 
of 
Appellants 
Case No. 
15285 
This i~ an action hy appellants to recover damages 
for defective horne construction and counterclaims by 
respomll·nts for an accounting and trespass. 
DISl'llSITIO:--! IN LOWER ())lJRT 
. \ C t e r c n n s n l ida t e J t r i a l \v i t h C i vi l No . 4 31 3 7 , Edward \\' . 
Barney :md llclcne Barney, Plaintiffs vs. Doyal Evan Stewart, 
ct al., Dclencl.lnts, B:nneYs were granted judgment against 
lJclcn·!Jnts dllcl Rcspundents in the sum of $1,615.00 for Breach 
.•C l\':1rr.1ntv for Jefcctivc construction, the tHo counterclaims 
of Defendants - Respondents against Plaintiffs -Appellants 
wc·rc' C.: t .mis~cd no caus:, of action and Plaintiffs - Appellants 
•cor:pl1 1nt :H~:l ~nst Defendants v.·as dismissed on the grounds 
- l -
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damage had not been proven because Appellants had sold the 
home since its purchase from Respondents. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek a remand of the case to the trial court 
to determine damage for defective construction based upon 
the proper rule for measure of damage in implied and expresse~ 
breach of warranty cases which is the cost of repair plus 
the loss of use and other damage consequently incurred as 
the result of the breach. 
STATE~ENT OF fACTS 
Respondert< developed, constructed, and ~old to Plain-
tiffs ':;le' ;·iti<-ll occupants il horne situate on rnor,crty 
tah County, Utah. 
home was recorded on March 12, 1974. 
( R~ 2) 
(R4 2) 
The deed to said 
About the same time, Plaint1ffs - Appellants also C0n-
tracted with Defendants - Respondents to complete the base-
ment of said horne and convert the carport into a garage. (R60' 
Said contract was separate and apart from the original con-
tract for the sale of the home. (R61; T:'lll; 16-24] 
Plaintiffs moved into the l:ome in about March l'l74 (T36: 
2-9) and discovered various detects 1n the roof \·:hicil caust·d 
leaking (Tl6, 23, 21]; a settling front porch <1nd 'i!d<ewalk 
(Tl7: 9-13); a peeling and chipped dri Ch:± Tl~. ~1-:~]; 
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unsealed overhanging floor joist and windows which 
caused drafts (T25); improperly hung doors (TZB-29); 
and improperly located kitchen cahinets (T28-29). 
After each defect was discovered, Plaintiffs -
Appellants notified Defendants - Respondents of the 
problems (Tl7:l; 17:15; T3S). 
At the same time Plaintiffs - Appellants moved 
into the home, Plaintiffs - Appellants built a retaining 
wall. (Tl6:6) 
The defects discovered by Plaintiffs - Appellants 
caused lc:1king in their home (Tl6); uncomfortable winter 
n!Onth5 (T~S); and the inconvenience in use of doors and 
cabinets (T29- 30). 
Plaintiffs - Appellants resided in said home for 
over 2 1/2 years until August 1976, when they sold same 
to Robert Boisen. (T38:24-30) 
Prior to trial, an original Defendant State Savings 
~ Loan Association, a corporation, was removed from the 
case through Stipulation and Order of Dismissal. (R37) 
At the consolidated trial herein of this case and 
Civil case So. 43137, Barney v. Stewart, et al, numerous 
witnesses were called and roof shingles and nails entered 
intu C\'idcncc by Plaintiffs- Appellauts to show the 
dcicLtt\C' cOTI~truct.ion alledged. (Jd~-36) 
- 3-
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During the trial, Plaintiffs - Appellants objected to 
all testimony admitted regarding the subsequent sale of 
Plaintiffs -Appellants' home by Plaintiffs -Appellants 
to a third party. (T38:18; 39:2; 39:1C>-20) The first counter-
claim of Defendants - Respondents was dismissed for failure 
to prove damages (T48:21-30; 49:1-23; 61:5-ll) and the 
second counterclaim of Defendants - Respondents was dismissed 
for failure to show that the retaining wall constructed by 
Plaintiffs - Appellants trespassed on property owned by 
Defendants- Respondents. (T48:10-20) Then, at the close 
of the evidence, Plaintiffs - Appellants moved the court for 
an order- - ·· · ·-· ·' • 'J Rule 37(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
as amenGed, enl~tling Plaintiffs - Appellants to reasonable 
costs and expenses including reasonable attorney fees for 
proving facts denied by Defendants - Respondents in Request 
for A dm iss ions . ( T 6 3 - 6 4 ) 
The court took the cases under advisement (T64; R36) and 
on April 27, 1977, rendered its memorandum decision granting 
Defendants prior Motion to Dismiss stJting among other thing•: 
"that Plaintiffs have failec to prove that they suffered~ 
damages as a result of the allcdged defective construction, 
and because they, without repair i ng __ _?amc ~o 1 d l!!~_r:_(JJ'~ 
prior to the time of trial und failed tc• c:-tab.Jish t:1Jt 
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_0_~· received less from the sale than they would have 
received had the Defendants constructed the home in a 
m3nner acceptable to them and without the conditions 
they complajn of herein. Also, Plaintiffs did not 
ad,·i:,e ~'tnchaser of the alledged defects they com-
plain of in this action," (R Supplemental Record on 
Appeal), and on May 26, 1977, signed and entered its 
Findings and Conclusions which stated in part, "there 
is no evidence in the record that the sales price would 
have been greater had the defects which Plaintiffs claimed 
to have been present, not existed. The record is devoid 
of any evidence from which the court could conclude that 
the market v~lue of the lot and residence or that 
the sales price ~auld have been greater without the claimed 
defeLto;_," (Rl7:1-6) stating in its conclusions its 
measure of damages as ''the proper measure of damages to the 
f'l~tintjffs_bad_Plaintiffs suffered any damage would have 
been the difference het1:een the value of the residence 
£l:l!:Chascd J,, then with and without the claimed defects or if 
!l!_~~~ntiffs retained ownership of the property, the cost 
c.!l. rc·mcdvinr, the defects." (Pl 7:17- 21), and dismissing 
Plainriffs -Appellants Complaint by its Decree dated 
~1<1) }b, 1"77. (RlS) 
- s-
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POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COW>liTTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY COt\SIDERDIG 
EVIDENCE REGARDii'JG PLAINT! FFS' SUBSEQUENT SALE OF TilE HOME 
ORIGINALLY SOLD BY DEFENDANTS DOYAL E\'AN STE\'.'ART AND KAREl\ 
LEE STEWART TO PLAINTIFFS. 
The main question to be decided by the court in this 
action is whether the subsequent sale of a home by initial 
purchasers of same affects the initial purchaser's right 
to recover damages against the original developer-builder 
for defective construction. 
The court mistakenly was unable to distinguish the 
initial sale of the new construction to Plaintiffs - Appella~ 
and the s:~[-~l a.e~t sale of said construction to third parties 
as tl-''l :1ansactions. The court consolidated tho 
cases regarding two homes constructed by Defendants - Respon~ 
and awarded damages for defective new construction to Barneys 
in Civil No. 43137, Barney v. Stewart, et al, but denied 
Plaintiffs -Appellants the right to damage since they had 
sold their home prior to trial. 
In arriving at the conclusion that Plajntiff5 - :\flJ ellan: 
were not entitled to damage, the court mistal,enly :1e~nd testi· 
many regarding said subsequent sale and therefrom f0und the 
following in its memorandum decision: 
... Plaintiffs have failed to prove that they suffcr~d 
any damage as a result of the alledre~ dtfectiye con-
struction, and because they, without rq,;~irJng same, 
sold the property prior to the t imc of tr ;:il :11 ,I fJilcd 
- (,-
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to establish that they received less from the sale 
than they would have received had the Defendants 
constructed the home in a manner acceptable to them 
and without the conditions they complain of herein. 
~lso, Plaintiffs did not advise the purchaser of 
the alledged defects they complain of in this action. 
(R Subsequent Record on Appeal) 
The court further ironiously found: 
There is no evidence in the record that the sales 
price would have been greater had the defects which 
Plaintiffs claimffim have been present not existed. 
The record is devoid of any evidence from which the 
court could conclude that the market value of the 
lot and residence or that the sales price would have 
been greater without the Clairred defects. (Rl7) 
The trial court then went on in its conclusions to create 
its new and novel measure of damages for injury to real 
property stating as follows: 
The proper measure of damages to the Plaintiffs had 
Plaintiffs suffered any damage would have been the 
difference between the value of the resid~nce pur-
chased by them with and without the claimffi defects 
or if the Plaintiffs retained ownership of the 
property, the cost of remedying the defects. (Rl7) 
The ~ell Established Criteria for Determining Damage to Real 
Property is Whether the Damage is Temporary or Permanent. 
Our own Utah Supreme Court, the Restatement of the Law 
oi Contr;1cts, recogni -c:d treatises, and other jurisdictions 
hold to the same rul cs. .'\1 tl,uttgh stated in minor varing 
horJs, t~c same underlying rule is: In the event injury 
to real 1,roperty is temporary, the measure of damage is 
t h c r o ~· s ,, n ;1 b lc cos t of r era i r I· 1 us an)' cons e que n t i a 1 or 
inc icl '~' :11 damage, <~nd 1 f the i n_i ury is permanent, the 
lllc',l'-IJrc of d:H:i<lge 1vould be the differcncC' hetwC'en thC' value 
I 
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immediately before and the value immediately after the 
injury. 
Our Utah Supreme Court held to this above rule in 
Fuhriman, Inc. vs. Jarrell, 21 U2d Zl8, 445 P2d 136 (Utah 
1968) in which the court held: 
The measure of damages for improper water proofing 
of foundation was correctly based on the cost of 
repair even though the tri~l court incorrectly 
described damages asdiminution in market value 
of dwelling. 
The State of Washington in a new-construction breach 
of warranty case decided that damages to be allowed for 
breach of warrant) in construction of a new house would be 
for the c , s t _- + _. _,- and such other damage as was proved 
to be the ~.celt .e,ult of the breach and damages should not 
have been a~arded on the basis of the difference in value 
of the property before and after. Christensen vs. l!uskins, 
397 P2d 830, 65 Wash. 2d 417 (Wash. 1964). 
The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Section 346(1) 
regarding damages recoverable for breach uf J cc,nstructiun 
contract is often quoted by the courts, and was :co quotc·d in 
both our Utah Fuhriman case and the Washington ChristE:nscn 
case. Said restatement section states: 
(a) For defective or unfinished constructtun he can 
get judgment for either 
-8-
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(i) The reasonable cost of construction and 
completion in accordance with the contract 
if this is possible and does not involve ' 
unreasonable economic waste or 
(ii) The difference between the value that the 
product contracted for would have had and 
the value of performance that has been 
received by the Plaintiff, if construction 
and completion in accordance with the 
contract would involve unreasonable economic 
waste. 
McCormick in his treatise on damages also states the 
rule as follows: 
In whatever way the issue arises, the generally 
approved standards for measuring the owner's loss 
from defects in the work are two: First, in cases 
where the defect is one that can be repaired or 
cured without undue expense, so as to make the 
building conform to the agreed plan, then the 
owner recovers such amount as he has reasonably 
expended, or will reasonably have to expend, to 
remedy the defect. McCormick on Damages, Section 168, 
Page 648. 
On the other hand, if the expenditure for reconstruction 
is disproportionate to the end to be obtained or would en-
danger unduly other parts of the building then the measure 
of damz:ge would be "the difference between the value of 
the building as it is and what it would have been worth if 
it had been huilt in conformity with the contract." 
McCormick on Damage,Supra. 
American Jurisprudence states the~nerally accepted 
rule as rollows: 
- ~-
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Most courts take the view that the measure of damages 
for temporary injuries (to real property) is the 
cost of repairing the damage or restoring the property 
to its original condition. 22 Am. Jur.2d, Damages, 
Section 135 and 336 (also Colella vs. King Company, 
72 Wash. 2d, 433 P2d 154.) 
The same rule is stated in Corpus Juris Secundum thus: 
The measure of damages for a permanent injury to real 
property ls generally the fair value of the property 
immediotely before and immediately after the injury. 
The reco\~ry for a temporary injury to real property 
is measured by the lo5s sustained to the owner and 
may include the cost of restoration if less than the 
difference in value, and the diminution in the value 
of the use and enjoyment or rental value of the 
property during the term the injury exists. 25 C.J.S. 
Damages, Section 84. 
Plaintiffs - A;'r·ell ants can in their search find no 
precedent fJr t'·2 p-•nosition that the subsequent sale of 
the home ,, r ·nchased would require the application 
of the permaGent damage or excessive economic waste rule 
requiring a determination of diminution in value of the 
property at the time of the injury, and certainly cannot find 
any precedent for the proposition that if a person subsequently 
sells a defective item, he must show that he could have sold 
the item for more if the item had not been defective. 
DamageisDetermined at the Time of the lni~. 
The point in time when damage is determii'Cd is 1·1hcn tl c 
injury occurs. When an individual falls from a hor~e ~c is 
injured at the timE· of the fall. 1.' her an indi ,. i .'u.J! rccc i \'f_'S 
a defective iron, )H' is injurrJ at t!1t· tlf"c he ic; ,~eli'.< ~~·d 
the iron. When an inJividuol n•cclvesa Jcfectivc L ·nc, !.c Ij 
l 0-
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injured at the time the home is delivered. The damage 
accruing to an individual who contracted to receive an 
item but received less than he contracted for is the 
loss of the benefit of the bargain. He expected to 
receive and bargained to receive something which he did 
not fully receive. 
The amount of damage which an individual suffers must 
be determined at the date of the injury plus any further 
damage which flows from the original injury. This general 
rule has been stated as follows: 
As a general rule, the damages upon breach of 
contract are to be measured as of the date of the 
breach. Under this rule, fluctuations in value 
after breach do not affect the recovery allowed. 
22 Am. Jur.2d, Damages, Section 52; Gaylord Bulder 
vs. Richmond Metal Manufacturing Corp., 140 A2d 
358 (Pennsylvama 1958). 
The price at which a home was sold 2 l/2 years later 
cannot be used as the base price from which damage is 
computed. Nor can the value of the home 2 l/2 years 
after it was originally delivered to Plaintiffs - Appellants 
be considered in determining whether damage occurred 
2 l/ 2 years previous. 
Predicating a Person's Right to Recover Damages for Defective 
Construction Upon Whether or Not He has Possession and 
O~nership of the Defective Property at the Time of Trial, 
i~ Arbitrary and Capricious. 
The tri~l court in this case heard two consolidated 
- ll-
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actions regarding construction of two home~ located across 
the street from each other. Both homes were constructed 
by and developed by Defendants - Respondents. The court 
granted a judgment for damages to the Barneys who still 
maintain possession and ownership of their home, but 
stated through its decision, findings, and Conclusions 
that because the Mitchells had sold their home prior to 
trial, the Mitchells would have to show that they could 
have sold their home at a higher value if the damages did 
not exist. Such a requirement is arbitrary and capricious, 
discriminator) and illogical. 
The mer: -~ct ~~at an individual sells his home which 
was orig ~ ; ·. ': rt' d to him in a defect i v e con d i t ion, 
should not require that individual to show how much the 
home had appreciated in value over the period of time in 
1vhich he had held possession, how much improvements he had 
put into the property, how much the basis of his property 
had been increaoccl from the initi;d purchJ5e, and l,'hJt 1he 
home would have subsequently sold for had there not been any 
defects. If this 1;ere the rule to be applied, then the- :.arne\' 
who recovered damages for reasonable repair cost~ should have 
been required to also shov.· how much their hon>~' lLHl incrL·a·.ec' 
in appraised value, how many improvements t:tc:y ha,J pL.t 1nto 
the home, etc., for the only difference bct\H'cn tire t~;o :occsoi 
- l 2-
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was the fact that one still had their home and the other 
had sold it. 
Moreover, even if the defects in the home of the 
Plaintiffs - Appellants were permanent and irrepairable, 
the value of the home at the time of possession would 
be the r2levant factor before the court. The value at 
which the home was sold 2 l/2 years hence would not be 
relevant to determine that original value. It has been 
said: 
In order to be relevant, evidence on an issue 
as to the value of real estate must relate to the 
time as of which value of the property is to be 
determined, or to a time so near thereto that it 
may reasonably throw light on the value at such 
time, and evidence of value at a time considerably 
before or after the time to which the controversy 
relates is not admissable unless it also appears 
that the value has remained the same. 31A C.J.S., 
Evidence, Section 182(6). 
In this case the home purchased by Plaintiffs -
Appellants from Defendants - Respondents was sold by 
Plaintiffs - Appellants more than 2 l/2 years after 
same had been originally delivered to Plaintiffs -
~ppellants. (T38:28-30) The price of the original pur-
chase did not include the completion of a basement and 
the conversion of a carport into a garage. (R42:25-27; 
R4S·l6-20; Rl23-l24) The value of the home originally 
rece1ved without the garage and basement completed cer-
- l 3-
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But the most important point is that just because the 
home was sold by Plaintiffs - Appellants does not mean 
that they need to show that the value at which they sold 
the home was less than they could have sold it for. Nor 
does it require Plaintiffs - Appellants to prove damages 
by the formula of the diminution in value. 
Reasonable Cost of Repair Was a Proper Measure of Damages. 
The damages testified to by Plaintiff - Appellant 
Ronald G. Mitchell were repairable. They were not per-
manent and irrepairable damages, nor were they damages 
which to rerair huuld cost unnecessary economic waste. 
The prorer measure of damages in this situation was 
the reas2~:":· u•~ ~f repair plus any loss of use of 
propertyand other lncidental and consequential damage 
flowing from the original defects. The fact that the 
roof leaked and had to be rq•aired, the inconvenience of 
the leakage, the uncomfortableness of the drafts, the in-
convenience and uncumfortableness of the improperly hung 
doors and cabinets, all were the proper measure of damage. 
Our court has said regarding damage that it shuuld 
be computed in the easiest possible wa). Our court ha~ 
said: 
Sreaking generally about d;n1age~;, ll:e desired objective 
is to evalu2te an) loc;c suffered h) the most direct, 
- 1 4 -
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practical, and accurate method that can be 
employed. Even Odds Inc. vs. Nielson, 
448 P2d /0~, 22 U2d 49 (Utah 1968). 
The most direct, practical, and accurate method 
for determining damage in real estate injury cases of this 
nature has been repeatedly stated as the cost of repair 
unless the injury is permanent and unrepairable. 
~nd there is no measure of damages stated which would 
require a determination that the amount at which the property 
was s11bsequently sold was less than the amount at which it 
could have been sold. 
Original Purchase and Subsequent Sale Are Two Separate 
Transactions Involving Two Separate Sets of Rights and 
!Zesponsibilities. 
Plaintiffs - Appellants bought a newly constructed 
horne developed and built by Defendants - Respondents. 
Defendants - Respondents sold said newly constructed home 
to Plaintiffs - Appellants for a certain price. The 
home was to be completed in a good workmanlike manner as 
is recognized by implied warranties for new construction 
sold initially to the public. (See Annotation of liability 
uf builder vendor or other vendor of new dwelling for loss, 
injurv, or damage occasioned by defective condition 
thucof, 25 ALJ<.3d 383, et seq.) 
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If the home delivered to Plaintiffs - Appellants was 
defective in workmanship, Plaintiffs - Appellants received 
less than they bargained for, and if said defects were 
repairable, which they were in this case, the damage to 
Plaintiffs - Appellants was the reasonable cost of repair. 
Plaintiffs - Appellants sold their home to thi1d 
parties. The transaction between Plaintiffs -Appellants 
and the third parties is a separate contractual arrangement 
and if Plaintiffs - Appellants sold said home to the 
third parties by fraud or misrepresentation, the third parties 
would have a right of action against Plaintiffs - Appellants 
for sald fr;, L~ CT rr:isrepresentation. The right of action 
would ~·.1. A~~t hith the third parties to contest any 
impropriety in the sale of the home to them by Plaintiffs 
Appellants. 
But the Plaintiffs - Appellants were initially injured 
by the Defendants - Respondents. If the premises originally 
delivered to them were defective, they are entitled to 
compensation from Defendants - Respondents for any defects. 
The third parties who purchased the property the second 
time are subject to all of the defenses and entitled to all 
of the benefits of the legal theories of caveat emptor, fraui 
misrepresentation, breach of contract, etc., to recover from 
Plaintiffs -Appellants for any di3sut i~laction they have ~i~ 
-1 6-
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the purchase contract with Plaintiffs - Appellants. 
The court however, attempts to create a duty 
upon Plaintiffs - Appellants to advise the third parties 
of any alledged defects (R Subsequent Record on Appeal) 
when the court said in its memorandum decision of April 27, 
1977, "Also, Plaintiffs did not advise the purchaser of 
the alledged defects they complain of in this action." 
The court further in its findings stated "The records 
sho~ that the Plaintiffs disclaimed any liability to 
their grantees for any defective conditions of the house 
or the cement or the driveway." (Rl7) 
The above findings are irrelevant to the issues before 
the court and were not properly considered. 
Conclusion. 
The consideration by the court of the subsequent sale 
of the home of Plaintiffs - Appellants to third parties 
as not correct. The court created an improper measure of 
damages theory. 
Plaintiffs - Appellants should be entitled to damages 
based upon the reasonable cost of repair. The case should 
be remanded to determine said damage in accordance with the 
record. 
Real property appreciates in value, certain items of 
-17-
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personal property appreciate in value, improvements arc made 
to real property, and other transactions enter in after a 
person receives the benefit or a partial benefit of a 
bargain. An individual should not be precluded from damages 
for failure to receive the full benefit of the bargain be-
cause he subsequently sells the item received. 
-18-
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CO~IITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY FAILING TO 
AWARD PLAINTIFFS THEIR COSTS FOR SUCCESSFULLY DEFENDING 
AGAINST THE COUNTERCLAIMS OF DEFENDANTS. 
The counterclaims brought by Defendants were (1) that 
Plaintiffs - Appellants owed Defendants - Respondents 
compensation not yet paid for completion of the basement 
and conversion of a carport into a garage on the home pur-
chased by Plaintiffs - Appellants from Defendants -
Respondents, and (2) Plaintiffs - Appellants trespassed 
upon property owned by Defendants - Respondents by constructing 
a concrete wall thereon. (Rl23-127) 
Both of these counterclaims were dismissed by the 
court at trial without the necessity of Plaintiffs - Appellants 
putting on a defense. (T48, 49, & 61) 
Plaintiffs - Appellants feel that they were entitled 
to award of costs in successfully defending against said 
counterclaims. Said award of costs is provided for in 
Rule S4(d)(l) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as 
amended and states: 
Except when express provision therefor is made 
either in a statute of this state or in these 
rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to 
the prevailing party unless the court other-
wise directs. Rule 54(d)(l), URCP, as amended. 
The court did make no directions in its Decision, 
-19-
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Findings, Conclusions, or Judgment that costs should not be 
awarded to Plaintiffs - Appellants for prevailing on their 
counterclaims. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY FAILING 
TO AWARD PLAINTIFFS THEIR EXPENSES INCLUDING REASONABLE 
ATTORNEY FEES FOR PROVING THE TRUTHFULNESS OF REQUESTS 
FOR ADMISSIONS DENIED BY DEFENDANTS PERTAINING TO THE 
COUNTERCLAIMS OF DEFENDANTS DISMISSED AT TRIAL. 
At the end of the trial herein, Plaintiffs -
Appellants moved the court for an order awarding Plaintiffs -
Appellants their expenses including reasonable attorney fees 
for proving the truthfulness of Requests,for Admissions 
denied by Defendants - Respondents. (T63-64) 
Plaintiffs - Appellants feel that the court errored 
in failing to pass upon said motion by either denying or 
affirming same. The court failed in its Decision, Findings, 
Conclusions, or Judgment to render decision regarding said 
motion. (R Supplemental Record on Appeal; 16-17; and 15) 
Rule 37(c) URCP, as amended, states: 
If a party fails to admit the genuineress of any document 
or the truth of any matter as requested under Rule 36, 
and if the party requesting the Admissions thereafter 
proves the genuineness of the document or the truth of 
the matter, he may apply to the court for an order 
requiring the other party to pay him the reasonable 
expenses incurred in making that proof, including 
reasonable attorney fees. The court shall make the 
order unless it finds that (1) the request was held 
objectional pursuant to Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission 
sought was of no substantial importance, or (3) the 
party failing to admit had reasonable ground to be-
lieve that he might prevail on the matter, or (4) there 
- 21-
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was other good reason for the failure to admit. 
Rule 37(c), URCP, ~amended. 
The court made no such findings as required by the rule 
and Plaintiffs - Appellants feel that they are entitled to 
Findings by the court, Conclusions, and granting or denial 
of their Motion. 
Plaintiffs - Appellants also feel that since the counter-
claims of Defendants - Respondents were dismissed after the 
allegations of same proved fruitless, their expenses including 
reasonable attorney fees should have been awarded by the court 
or at least Findings, Conclusions, and and Order made regardi~ 
their mot1sn for same. 
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CONCLUSION 
The major point of contention of Plaintiffs -
Appellants is that the court errored in looking at the 
subsequent sale of the home in question to third parties, 
that the court considered an improper measure of damages, 
and that the proper measure of damages should have been 
the reasonable cost of repair. 
The question of awarding of costs when an individual 
prevails on a counterclaim and the question of making 
Findings, Conclusions, and an Order denying or granting 
an Order under Rule 37(c) are fundamental and the require-
ment to do so should be made clear by the Supreme Court. 
THEREFORE, PLAINTIFFS - APPELLANTS PRAY that this case 
be remanded to the court to determine damages in accordance 
with the reasonable cost of repair,andm validating the 
court's mistaken measure of damages. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
McCune & McCune 
96 East 100 South 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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